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COMMENTS
A STUDY OF THE FLORIDA MECHANICS' LIEN LAW AND ITS
UNSUSPECTED PITFALLS
The Mechanics' Lien Act' seeks to protect not general creditors but
specifically those2 who have made improvements upon another's real
property, the purpose being to afford protection by insuring payment through
the medium of a lien.3
Locally, mechanic's liens constitute a material part of chancery practice
inasmuch as construction is the major industry and the largest source of
employment. Yet in many respects the protection via the lien law afforded
persons engaged in this type of work is so ineffectual, as discussed herein-
after, that as a practical matter the law has caused irreparable harm. Unless
drastic steps are taken to rectify it, the future holds nothing but confusion,
fraud and hopeless conflicts.
GENERALLY
Where labor is performed and materials are furnished for another and
the latter fails to pay, one of the remedies is an action of assumpsit, the
common counts having been abolished. 4 The gist of the lien law is to
provide an enforceable means of collecting from one whose property has
been improved through a procedure of filing a lien against the property,
thereby charging it with the debt.' The lien is potent in that it ties up,
encumbers and affects the marketability of the property to which it attaches.
It is well to note, however, that the owner may relieve the property so
encumbered by substituting therefor a bond6 in the amount of the lien claim
filed, in which event the lien attaches to the security. Thus the enforcement
of a lien is a strong weapon in the hands of a person who has performed,
while a successful claimant in an action of assumpsit is faced with an
enpty claim.
The right to a lien is predicated on performance, not upon breach of
contract, 7 thereby preventing unjust enrichment by one person at the ex-
pense of another. The lien attaches to the owner's right, title or interest,8
1. FiA. STAT. C. 84 (1949).
2. FLA. STAT. § 84.02 (1949) (contractor, sub-contractor, materialman, laborer).
3. Atkins v. Kendrick, 138 Fla. 776, 190 So. 248 (1939); Nat. Bank of Jacksonville
v. 'Williams, 38 Fla. 305, 20 So. 931 (1896).
4. FLA. STAT. § 51.03 (1949), repealed by Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26962.
5. FLA. STAT. § 84.02 (1949).
6. FLA. STAT. § 84.24 (1949).
7. Golub v. DeLinardy Flooring Co., 44 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1950); London Operating
Co. v. Continental Const. Co., 118 Fla. 15, 159 So. 33 (1935); Armstrong Cork &
Insulation Co. v. Croman, 105 Fla. 553, 141 So. 754 (1932); Cooper v. Passmore,
103 Fla. 744, 138 So. 48 (1931).
8. FLA, STAT. § 84.03 (1949).
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including an equitable interest,9 at the time of performance. In the case of
a lessee' who invites construction, the lien attaches to the lessee's interest
in being at the time of the making of the lease. Conversely, where the lessee
is required by the lessor 1 to make improvements, the lien attaches to the
lessor's interest also. Similarly, mechanics' liens attach to homestead
property 12 being improved. In the case of an estate by the entireties, the
wife upon knowledge and notice that construction is in progress must make
any objection thereto within ten days thereof, and failure to so object will
entitle the claimant to perfect his lien.'
The lien accrues and relates back to visible commencement of operations
except in cases of demolition.' 4 Where the lienor is dealing directly with the
owner, in order to perfect his lien it must be filed within ninety days from
the last day of performance of labor or furnishing of materials.' However,
where the lienor (except a laborer)' is not in privity 7 with the owner, he
may, during the progress of work, but not later than thirty days after com-
mencement, give the owner written notice of intention to claim a lien.'
Such notice informs the owner of the possibility of a claim and if the owner
should disregard it, he assumes the risk of paying twice for the same work.'
Within ninety days after the last day of performance the lienor must
file his claim of lien with the clerk of the circuit court wherein the property
is located.20 A claim of lien may be amended at any time during the time
allowed for filing the same. 2' Further, the lienor must, within ten days,
serve a copy of the recorded lien upon the owner by registered mail, return
receipt requested. If the owner cannot be located within such period the
posting of a copy within the prescribed ten-day period in a conspicuous
9. Arbuthnot v. Moody Co., Inc., 115 Fla. 503, 155 So. 840 (1934).
10. Robert L. Weed, Architect, Inc. v. Homing, 159 Fla. 847, 33 So.2d 648 (1948);
Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors, Inc., 149 Ila. 644, 6 So.2d 818 (1942).
11. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Joseph Langner, Inc., 43 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1949).
12. Lamb v. Ralston Purina Co., 155 Fla. 638, 21 So.2d 127 (1945); Anderson
Mill & Lumber Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588_(1931); Jones v. Carpenter,
90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925); Giddens v. Dickenson, 60 Fla. 320, 53 So. 929 (1910);
But cf. Lewton v. Hower, 18 Fla. 872 (1882).
13. FLA. STAT. § 84.12 (1949), Leroy v. Reynolds, 141 Fla. 586, 183 So. 843
(1940); Velasquez v. Suarez, 113 Fla. 856, 152 So. 708 (1934); Mead v. Picotte, 101
Fla. 325, 134 So. 57 (1931).
14. FLA. STAT. § 84.03 (1949).
15. Roughan v. Rogers, 145 Fla. 42, 199 So. 572 (1940); Heudry Lumber Co.
v. Bryant, 138 Fla. 485, 189 So. 710 (1939); State v. Chillingworth, 126 Ha. 645, 171
So. 649 (1936).
16. FLA. STAT. § 84.04(4) (1949).
17. Spinney v. Sanford.Orlando Kennel Club, 123 Fla. 113, 166 So. 559 (1936);
But see Stowers v. Wheat, 78 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1935); First Nat. Bank of Tampa v.
Southern Lumber & Supply Co., 106 Fla. 821, 145 So. 594 (1932).
18. FLA. STAT. § 84.04 (1949), Tallahassee Variety Works v. Brown, 106 Fla.
599, 144 So. 848 (1932).
19. Investors Syndicate v. Henderson, 148 Fla. 696, 6 So.2d 629 (1941); Hendry
Lumber Co. v. Bryant, supra note 15.
20. FLA. STAT. § 84.16 (1949), Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, 145 Fla. 216, 198
So. 841 (1940).
21. FLA. STAT. § 84.17 (1949).
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place upon the property improved is deemed proper service within the mean-
ing of the statute.22
In this jurisdiction, enforcement of a lien in equity by means of fore-
closure must be commenced23 within one year from the date of the filing
of the claim of lien. A special summary proceeding at law enables laborers
to obtain a judgment within five days, an exclusive and expeditious remedy
peculiar to this class of lienors.2
4
NOTICE OF INTENTION To CLAIM A LIEN
Those persons who are not in privity of contract with the owner,25 with
the exception of laborers,26 are required to send cautionary notice. In theory,
cautionary notice serves a dual purpose. It places the owner on notice that
the contractor has not paid some of the lienors, impounding in the owner's
hands monies that otherwise might be paid to the contractor to the detri-
ment of the lienor had no notice been given. This protects the owner from
paying for the same services twice.27 It also gives the lienor the right to
priority of payment over those not giving such notice.28 The aggregate
amount of the liens cannot exceed the contract price.29 The rights of the
lienor are subrogated to those of the contractor inasmuch as cautionary
notice only secures that portion of the monies due and owing to the con-
tractor at the time of service of the notice and only in the amount set forth
therein. It follows, therefore, that under a contract wherein payment is
made in installments as the work progresses, if a contractor submits an
affidavit to the effect that at this stage of construction all subcontractors
have been paid,80 and the owner relying on this affidavit then makes pay-
ment, which is deemed "proper payment,"' cautionary notice sent the next
day would be fruitless. The quaere that naturally arises as to why cautionary
notice was not sent can be answered by the analogy of a private in the Army
sending a letter to his commanding officer complaining of the inefficiencies
of his first sergeant. The moment a lienor or prospective lienor sent notice
to the owner, the contractor would without hesitation fire him on the spot
for placing him in a questionable position with the owner.
Because of the theoretical importance of cautionary notice and its
practical ineffectiveness, consider for a moment the ensuing hypotheticals
22. FLA. STAT. § 84.18 (1949).
23. FtA. STAT. § 84.21 (1949), Drake Lumber Co. v. Semple, 100 Fla. 1757, 130
So. 577 (1930); But see note 5, MIAMt L. Q. 521, 522 (1951).
24. FLA. STAT. § 86.06 (1949).
25. Pinellas Lumber Co. v. Lynch, 140 Ma. 559, 192 So. 475 (1939); Hendry
Lumber Co. v. Bryant, supra note 15.
26. Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, sutra note 20.
27. Hardee v. Richardson, 47 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1950).
28. FLA. STAT. § 84.06 (1949), W. T. Price Dredging Corp. v. Suarez, 147 Fla.
253, 2 So.2d 740 (1941).
29. FLA. STAT. § 84.02 (1949), Southern Paint Mfg. Co. v. Crump, 132 Fla. 799,
182 So. 291 (1938); Schilling v. Harrington, 135 Fla. 466, 186 So. 222 (1936).
30. Dodson v. Florida Nursery & Landscape Co., 138 Fla. 887, 190 So. 695 (1939).
31. FLA. STAT. § 84.05 (1949), Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, supra note 20.
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wherein the lien law, a creature of the statute designed to protect lienors,
can be used as a legal club to perpetrate fraud on a wholesale basis:
Three persons, a construction corporation (A), the owner of
the land (B) and the mortgagee (C), conspire to build one hundred
homes with a bare capital of $40,000 The property is examined,
a mortgage placed of record, and construction begins with work
being pushed along as rapidly as possible by A and token pay-
ments being made from time to time to stultify in the initial stage
of construction any suspicion of collusion. The lienors, desperate
for payment yet fearing the practical results stemming from the
giving of cautionary notice, abstain therefrom and are legally
enticed and forced into the collusive trap, shielded by judicial
misconception, attorneys' confusion and the porous construction
of the Mechanics' Lien Law. When the project nears completion,
A abandons construction, B purposely fails to make payments on
his mortgage to C who steps in and forecloses it as planned, there-
by divesting the lienors of their rights. C with a total investment
of $40,000 then acquires 100 homes fully completed, valued at ap-
proximately $200,000, his only encumbrance being a three-way split
among the parties in pari delicto. Not only has the lienor lost the
fruits of his labor, but his entire investment is thereby extinguish-
ed and he is without remedy. To add insult to injury, decisions
have established that there can be no attorneys' fees awarded to a
successful claimant,82 except in summary proceedings8 discussed
above, on the basis that such award is unconstitutional. This factor
would further deter a defrauded and remediless lienor from pur-
suing litigation where the possibility of a successful prosecution of
his cause is remote.
The second hypothetical revolves around an overzealous con-
tractor (K) and a negligent owner (0) where K in an effort to
complete a project without sufficient capital falsely executes affi-
davits that all lienors have been paid. 0 accepts these affidavits
from K and thereafter is considered as having made "proper
payment." For the reasons mentioned above, the lienors again
withhold giving cautionary notice. The climax is reached when
K, operating on an insolvent level, is forced to throw up his hands
and abandon the project. Thus, the lienors whose rights are sub-
rogated to those of K have no alternative but to file an information
with the Solicitor's office against K for false and fraudulent prac-
tice. This meets with no success, for the criminal courts have re-
peatedly stated that they will not act as a "collection agency", and
the poor lienor is left holding the proverbial "bag".
Some ingenious lienors have attempted to lessen the effect of com-
plying with cautionary notice provisions by enmeshing the requirements in
the form of a courteous letter.3 4 In most reported cases the force and effect
32. Union Terminal Co. v. Turner Const. Co., 247 Fed. 727 (1918); Franklin
Savings & Loan Co. v. Fisk, 98 Fla. 683, 124 So. 42 (1929); Martin v. Rothar, 94 Fla.
207, 113 So. 713 (1927).
33. Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1949).
34. Salomon v. Calinsky, 103 Fla. 417, 137 So. 386 (1931); Ramsey v. Hawkins,
78 Fla. 189, 82 So. 823 (1919).
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of the letter was so throttled that it fell below the essential statutory re-
quirements, thereby leaving the lienors helpless.3 5
Those states which adopt the "Direct Lien" system, also known as the
"Pennsylvania" system, 0 proceed oi the theory that the lien conferred on
a subcontractor, laborer or materialman is categorically a cbarge upon the
property so improved, completely eliminating therefrom any thought of
subrogation rights or indebtedness as between the original contractor and the
owner. The underlying rationale is based on any one of the following theories:
( 1 ) that the contract is important in that the contractor is impliedly deemed
an agent invested with the power to insure payment for labor performed
and materials furnished in accordance with the terms of the contract; 3 or
(2) that the owner ratifies the acts of the contractor in re labor hired and
materials furnished; 8 or (3) that the law affords protection to the deserving
claimant by preventing unjust enrichment where property has been im-
proved.30  Thus, the purpose of the "Direct Lien" statutes is to abrogate
the giving of cautionary notice, with protection afforded the lienors from
collusive enterprises 40 by insuring faithful performance of the terms of the
contract by both the owner and contractor.
Lastly, in completing the poorly engineered framework of cautionary
notice, it is noted that where a contractor had assigned to a third person
all monies due him from the owner, the supreme court, sensing the in-
equities that could be imposed upon the lienor, held41 that such an assign-
ment did not affect the lienor's rights, reversing an attitude42 theretofore
existing that such action would bar his rights. However, the lienor is in
no better position by this ruling and the supreme court failed again to
visualize that he is forced to preserve his employment by forbearing to file
notice rather than to perfect his lien by such filing.
VISIBLE COIMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND THE MYS-TERY OF TIE
)OCRINE OF RELATION BACK
Although there are a few cases in other jurisdictions 8 which collectively
show a cleavage point, the courts have given a clear picture and definition of
what constitutes "visible commencement of operations"; i. e., that type of
improvenent that takes on the appearance that positive construction is in
35. Truelsen v. Southern Lumber Co., 87 Fla. 327, 100 So. 267 (1924); Langford
v. Southern Florida Lumber & Supply Co., 63 Fla. 484, 59 So. 12 (1912); De Soto
Nat. Bank v, Arcadia Elec. Light, Ice & Tel. Co., 59 Fla. 479, 52 So. 612 (1910).
36. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Wyoming.
37. Boise-Payette Lunber Co. v. Felt, 44 Idaho 377, 258 Pac. 169 (1927).
38. Hlouston-Hlart Lumber Co. v. Neal, 16 NA. 197, 113 Pac. 621 (1911).
39. Pomeroy v. White Lake Lumber Co., 33 Neb. 243, 49 N.W. 1131 (1891).
40. Ballou v. Black, 21 Neb. 131, 31 N.W. 673 (1887).
41. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Eno, 99 Fla. 887, 128 So. 622 (1930).
42. Id. at 623.
43. Kiene v. [lodge, 90 Iowa 212, 57 N.V. 717 (1894); Security Stove & Mfg. Co.
v. Sellards, 133 Kan. 747, 3 P.2d 481 (1931); Erickson v. Ireland, 134 Minn. 156, 158
N.W. 918 (1916).
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progress. This has not caused as much confusion as the employment of the
doctrine of relation back. The statute in question" is very clear and reads
as follows:
All liens ...shall relate to and take effect from the time of
the visible commencement of operations except that, where de-
molition is involved ...
Unfortunately, there are no decisions to give vitality to this section.
The Mechanics' Lien Law is analogous to the Negotiable Instruments Law
in that various sections must be read together and tempered with custom
and usage of trade. It is first noticed in the section' entitled 'Definitions'
that "visible commencement of operations" means the first actual work of
improving on the property which is notice that construction is in progress.
The only remaining sections40 of value deal with priorities of lienors among
those improving the property and priority of liens as between conveyances,
mortgages, attachments, judgments or other encumbrances. 4
It is clear that the matter of crucial concern in the section in question 48
relates to the proper interpretation and construction of the expression "all
liens relate to and take effect from ,. " No other logical conclusion can
be reached from the language of this section when considerd in connection
with other sections and the known history than that regardless of when
particular work is performed the lien relates back to the time that any work
was started on the property. Therefore, one section'9 clearly establishes a
priority among the lienors themselves while the other section50 segregates
the lienors from other encumbrancers, thereby sustaining the proposition
herein set forth.
This section is definitely broad enough in its language to overcome the
presumption established tinder the previous Mechanics' Lien Law, under
which it was held"l that liens related back only to the time when the specific
lienor performed and that the relation back operated as to his lien only if
a continuing contract was involved. Also, tinder the previous Act, where
work had commenced and a mortgagee desired to have priority he could
make full payment of all liens up to date, receive a general release of liens
from all who performed and then record his mortgage which had priority
over any subsequent liens or encumbrances. 52 Further support for this
premise is found in the fact that the attaching date of a lien or right to a
lien is similar to a wife's dower right in that it is inchoate, and only upon
full compliance with the statute does it become a vested right and relate
back to commencement of operations. Any other result would be to place
44. FLA. STAT. § 84.03 (1949).
45. FLA. STAT. § 84.01 (1949).
46. FL. STAT. § 84.06 1949).
47. FL. STAT. § 84.20 1949).
48. FLA. STAT. § 84.03 :1949).
49. FLA. STAT. § 84.06 1949).
50. FL. STAT. § 84.03 1949).
51. North Bay Shore Land Co. v. Perry, 68 Fla. 322, 98 So. 139 (1923), Palm
Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Lainhart, 84 Fla. 662, 95 So. 122 (1922).
52. Palm Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Lainhart, supra note 51.
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the class of lienors such as roofers, painters and glaziers, who of necessity are
the last to perform, in an inferior position to those who were fortunate
enough to begin work earlier.
The present provisions as to "visible commencement of operations" are
not as harsh as they may seem when considered in light of the fact that a
diligent mortgagee can assure himself of the property by obtaining an
engineer's certificate to the effect that construction has not commenced
before recording his mortgage, thereby enabling him to achieve a superior
lien affording ample protection. The lienors, on the other hand, must
ascertain who is the true owner of the premises and thereafter actual con-
struction notice of their rights.
BASIC FOUNDATrION OF THE LIEN LAW: CONTRACT VS. STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
The cases are replete with the statement that the lien is acquired by
performance and not by breach of contract, 8 that the right to the lien is
not created by contract but is purely a creature of the statute5' and that
there must be full compliance with the lien law before a lien can be ac-
quired. 5 On the other hand, the rule has been announced that a contract
with the owner or his duly authorized agent is essential as a basis for the
lien.5 6 In reconciling the cases the question arises: What is the real basis
for the lien?
Performance is the essential prerequisite to the creation and acquisition
of a lien, while no rights are conferred for mere breach of contractST
The only reported exception 8 arose where a contract called for certain
prefabricated materials which had to be specially made. The court there
held that because of the uniqueness of the materials prepared, a valid lien
was created upon the purchaser's refusal to accept delivery.
The cases cited above were evidently decided on the basis of Sections
84.15 and 84.09. Section 84.09 requires that when materials are furnished
on an open account, the lienor, upon receipt of monies, shall demand in.
struction as to the application of payments so made, and failure to make
such a demand will cause a forfeiture of his lien rights."9 Under Section
84.15, the decisions are clear that if work is done under a single contract, a
single claim of lien is sufficient. 0 If the contracts be separate, then the
liens must be filed against the several parcels of land.6' Hence, whether a
53. Shad v. Arnow, 155 Fla. 164, 19 So.2d 612 (1944); "lTompson v. Wyles, 111
Fla 202, 149 So. 769 (1933).
54. Spinney v. Live Oaks Manor, 120 Fla. 465, 162 So, 864 (1935); Tallahassee
Variety Works v. Brown, suPra note 18.
55. Howland v. Gore, 152 Fla. 781, 13 So.2d 303 (1942); Buker v. Webster, 140
Fla. 471, 191 So. 835 (1939).
56. Lee v. Sas, 53 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1951); Price v. .P. Guerry & Son, 133 Fla. 754,
183 So. 1 (1938); Hogue v. Morrison Const. Co., 115 Fla. 293, 156 So. 377 (1934).
57. Cooper v. Passmore, supra note 7.
58. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Joseph Langner, Inc., supra note 11.
59. Biscayne Trust Co. v. Wolpert Realty & Improvement Co., 100 Fla. 1070,
130 So. 611 (1930).
60. Ibid; Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, subra note 20.
61. Biscayne Trust Co. v. Wolpert Realty & Improvement Co., supra note 59.
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lien attaches to one or more buildings depends upon the contract entirely. 2
Therefore, the lien is created upon performance and rendering of services,
but the amount of money secured by the lien and the parcels of land en-
cumbered are controlled by the terms of the contract.
This contention finds support in an Arkansas decision, the court saying,
... although the lien is a creature of the statute, it must have its foundation
in a contract, and on this account must correspond with the contract."
Close scrutiny of the Florida decisions reveals no clear understanding as
to when the contract comes into play as against the provisions of the
statute, but it is interesting to note the reaction of a Kansas court64 when
confronted with this problem. Sensing the fundamental distinction, it held
that " . . . mechanics and materialmcn (who) maintain and enforce their
liens separately on two lots belonging to the same party, on which buildings
are being constructed at the same time, cannot on the second lot, claim the
advantage of the earlier commencement of the building on the other lot to
give them a priority over an (intervening) mortgagee." The court went on
to point out, however, that the rule as enunciated was such only because
the lienors filed their liens improperly and had the proper procedure been
followed, the results of the case would have been different.
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to rectify the inadequacies of the present Mechanics'
Lien Law a bill was introduced at the 1951 session of the Legislature, the
purpose of which was to repeal the section requiring the giving of cautionary
notice to the owner by substituting therefor a requirement that 'proper
payment" can only be established by the owner upon presentment to him
of receipted bills and/or releases of liens. This requirement would delegate
to the owner an important essential preventive obligation, to which the
decisions pay lip service. 5 It does not, however, change the primary character
of the function of cautionary notice, but by this innovation a legal biopsy is
performed whereby the malignancies heretofore existing in the form of sub-
rogation rights between the contractor and owner and the acceptance by the
owner, without diligent inquiry, of false affidavits from the contractor, are
removed. The enactment of this bill would simulate our system to the
Direct Lien or Pennsylvania system, discussed above, but the bill was never
passed for reasons not reflected on the legislative rolls.
ANNE DION SOBIESKI
62. Ibid.
63. Burel v. East Arkansas Lumber Co., 129 Ark. 58, 195 S.W. 378 (1917).
64. Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Sellards, supra note 43.
65. Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, supra note 20.
